To the unfavorable position: They’re down 2-0 in these Finals to a Knicks team that is, at least statistically, performing like the greatest playoff team of all time. A 2-0 Finals deficit isn’t impossible to come back from, though history tells us it is when those losses come at home. 

Wembanyama has, figuratively and literally, been the biggest reason for the Spurs’ success. Their hopes of turning things around, starting with a Game 3 victory to avoid the dreaded 3-0 deficit, will hinge on Wembanyama being consistently impactful offensively in a way he largely hasn’t been so far.

At the high end, the beauty of Wembanyama offensively is the ability to move him around the board. You can space him and stretch defenses out; the Spurs are comfortable having him set or use screens on and off the ball. He’s dangerous in transition as a driver, spacer, or lob threat.

To the Knicks’ credit, they’ve done a great job of making life uncomfortable in virtually every context. They’ve been dutiful with their physicality and help defense, constantly pushing Wembanyama off his spots and showing him a crowd. He’s still been able to win some matchups — he is insanely good at basketball, after all — but it hasn’t been the steady stream of wins we’ve become accustomed to.

Averaging 27.5 points through the first two games certainly sounds good; doing so while converting 48% of his 2s (57% through the first three rounds), 27% of his 3s (37% through the first three rounds), and logging more turnovers (10) than assists (4) paints a different picture. There’s some small sample tax to be had, but this is quite literally the most important sample of the year. 

Among the many avenues that Wembanyama can get going, I’m most fascinated by how the Spurs can unlock him in pick-and-roll. His gravity as a roller is almost unparalleled; as a 7-foot-4* lob threat, it’s easy to map out why teams are concerned with him getting downhill unimpeded.

To the earlier point, it’s why we’ve seen so much activity against Wembanyama. It’d be one thing if the Knicks were simply peeling in their low man (player defending in the corner opposite from the action) early to show an extra body.

They’ve also been hitting Wembanyama with high tags, with someone from the wing hitting him to disrupt his path to the basket. It’s been interesting watching the Knicks toy with that concept while defending some of the Spurs’ pet actions. 

Their “V” action — a choose-your-own-adventure ball screen with a screener to either side of the ball-handler, set at an angle (hence the “V”) — has been pretty successful this season. It also should serve as a natural counter to wing tags since, well, the wings are clear. 

The Knicks have simply countered that counter by having the tag come from the unused screener’s defender. This ends in a tough basket for Stephon Castle, but pay attention to Jalen Brunson (and then, Mikal Bridges):

The immediate benefit to this kind of aggression is muting Wembanyama’s impact as an interior scorer. Of course, the drawback is opening up kick-outs to the perimeter for 3s or closeout attacks. 

This was the opening possession for the Spurs in Game 2. They ultimately score on this possession, but you’ll notice Bridges providing aggressive nail help early and Josh Hart zoning up as the low man against the initial ball screen:

I was impressed with how well (and decisively) the Spurs were able to counter the Knicks’ aggressive help on Wembanyama’s rolls in Game 2, particularly in the first half. Ideally, though, you’d want to have a blend of both — Wembanyama getting busy downhill and his gravity opening things up for others.

Through two games, this is shaping up to be the least successful series the Spurs have had generating offense on Wembanyama rolls. 

Here are those stats so far — how often he’s rolled out of a ball screen, how the Spurs have scored, and the rate in which he’s been (physically) tagged on them — courtesy of Second Spectrum:

• Blazers (4 games): 28 picks, 1.15 PPP, 10.7% tag rate

• Timberwolves (6 games): 83 picks, 0.99 PPP, 27.7% tag rate

• Thunder (7 games): 135 picks, 1.02 PPP, 37.8% tag rate

• Knicks (2 games): 50 picks, 0.93 PPP, 34% tag rate

I apologize for being reductive here, but 0.93 is simply not a figure that’ll get the job done in this series.

Looking ahead to Game 3 and beyond, I think there’s some low-hanging fruit for the Spurs to grab. 

One of the simplest things I’d call for: when running an empty side ball screen, have Wembanyama roll … toward the empty side more often. 

I certainly understand the logic behind Wembanyama rolling toward the middle of the floor as often as he does:

• It allows him to see where the defense is coming from — and presents simpler passing reads if (read: when) the Knicks commit an extra body. 

• If he pops instead of rolls toward the middle, it opens up 3-point opportunities for him (with the hidden effect of getting back in transition easier), as well as the built-in optionality of flowing into a two-man game on the other side of the floor.

• In light of some of the turnover issues that Castle has had at times during this postseason run, having him dribble toward the empty side (instead of dealing with nail help and everything else) is a way to raise the probability of actually getting a shot on goal.

I’d argue, if you’re looking to unlock Wembanyama more, that the roll direction needs to tilt the other way more often. Second Spectrum has Wembanyama down as the empty side PnR screener nine times in this series; he’s rolled or popped to the empty side once. Surely there’s room for more, right?

Force a back-pedaling Karl-Anthony Towns (Finals MVP right now, in my opinion) or Mitchell Robinson to high-point and contest lobs consistently. See how aggressive the Knicks want to peel in their low man within that context. 

If you’re worried about potential nail help, attempt to move it around by either cutting behind it, or implementing some off-ball screens (pindowns or flares, which the Spurs in particular love) to occupy the weakside of the floor.

There’s also the matter of where Wembanyama is setting his screens. Through two games, Wembanyama’s on-ball screens are coming 27.7 feet from the basket — a massive uptick from his regular-season mark (24.7 feet). It may be worth exploring some lower ones, which would put Wembanyama closer to the basket by default while also forcing the Knicks into some tough, quick-hitting help decisions.

To that end, here’s how the Spurs have fared when Wembanyama has screened (rolls and pops) in different areas:

• 0-22.9 feet: 9 picks, 1.25 PPP

• 23-26.9 feet: 16 picks, 0.64 PPP

• 27+ feet: 31 picks, 0.79 PPP

Continuing through the spacing lens, I wonder if we see more of the “flat” alignment — meaning that both wings are empty, both corners are filled, and a third player is stashed in the dunker spot. That could allow Wembanyama to roll without having to deal with those high tags or early swipes when he catches the ball, even if the speed of his roll may have to shift a bit to make it work. 

We have evidence from the Western Conference finals that a delayed roll could be successful:

This is a pop instead of a roll, but here’s a Game 2 example of the Spurs going with “flat” spacing and Wembanyama ultimately getting a drive out of it against a rotating Robinson:

As far as actions go: I don’t think the Spurs need to completely go away from their “V” setups, but their Spain (pick-and-roll paired with a back screen) or Double Drag (pick-and-roll with two screeners, one screener pops while the other screener rolls) alignments may be more fruitful in light of how the Knicks want to help.

On the Double Drag front, one possession burned in my brain from the end of Game 2 (before things really got wacky) was a rep where Wembanyama was the first screener and got to roll to the side where Devin Vassell was stashed in the corner.

With the wing empty, Wembanyama got to release freely; because Vassell was in the corner, his defender (Hart) didn’t peel in as aggressively as he might’ve otherwise. The result was a lob: 

It’s the playoffs, so I’m not arguing the Spurs should just spam that particular setup 30 times and have success. I do think it’s something they should explore more of.

Pick-and-roll isn’t the only way to get Wembanyama going, but it’s a pretty big lever the Spurs should work to put back on the table. If they can, Wembanyama’s impact will be louder and this series will feel differently. If they can’t … this series may be a short one.