On February 27, Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif declared that his country had entered a state of “open war” with Afghanistan. Pakistani Minister of Information Attaullah Tarar reported strikes on Kabul and Kandahar, which Afghan authorities have confirmed. Asif claimed that the Taliban has “gathered terrorists from around the world in Afghanistan” and is “exporting terrorism.” He also accused the Taliban of ties with India, with which Pakistan had entered into an armed conflict last May. 

Mosharraf Zaidi, the spokesman for Pakistan’s prime minister, described the military actions as a response to “unprovoked Afghan attacks.” According to him, the strike by Pakistani forces killed 133 Taliban fighters, and another 200 were wounded; 27 Afghan posts were destroyed and nine captured. In turn, Afghan forces reported the death of 55 Pakistani soldiers and the capture of 19 posts. The Taliban acknowledged eight casualties and 11 injuries on their side. On February 26, Afghan news channel Tolo News reported clashes with Pakistani forces in the border provinces of Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar, Khost, Paktia, and Paktika.

Fighting also occurred near the Durand Line – the disputed border between the two nations, which Afghanistan does not recognize. 

Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been strained in recent years, primarily due to the issue of the Durand Line – the 2,640-kilometer border that remains a major source of dispute between the two nations. When this border was established in the late 19th century, Pakistan did not exist on the world map; these territories were part of British India. The Durand Line was the result of a 1893 agreement between Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman Khan and Sir Mortimer Durand, a representative of the British colonial administration. For Britain, it was a tool for solidifying spheres of influence during the so-called ‘Great Game’ against the Russian Empire, and a means of securing the northwestern borders of British India. 

Afghanistan has always viewed the Durand Line as an externally imposed border. In the 19th century, Afghanistan (like its neighbor Iran) became a battleground for two major empires. Despite two Anglo-Afghan wars, the British were never able to establish direct control over Afghanistan. The latter managed to maintain its independence, although it had to make several compromises, including signing the 1893 agreement. 

After the Second World War, London could no longer manage its colonies and British India ceased to exist. In 1947, the independent states of India and Pakistan were established. Pakistan inherited the borders of former British India in the northwest, including the Durand Line. However, Kabul has never officially recognized it as a definitive international border. Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan’s admission to the UN in 1947 due to territorial disputes and its refusal to acknowledge the Durand Line as a legitimate boundary. Although Kabul soon shifted its stance and established diplomatic relations with Pakistan in 1948, tensions over the Pashtun issue persisted.

Since then, no Afghan government – be it monarchic, republican, communist, or Islamist – has recognized the Durand Line as a legitimate international border. Afghanistan views it as a colonial remnant and the result of a policy of external pressure. 

Kabul’s position largely hinges on the assertion that the 1893 agreement has expired. According to it, the agreement ended in 1993, and must be re-evaluated. Afghanistan adamantly refuses to renew or extend the treaty, believing its legal foundations have eroded. Certain Afghan experts and politicians have also called for the re-evaluation of the northern sections of the border, including areas north of Chitral, which are viewed as historically contentious.

In contrast, Pakistan regards the Durand Line as a definitively settled international boundary. Islamabad emphasizes that after the partitioning of British India in 1947, it inherited borders established by the former colonial administration and recognized by the international community. Pakistan adheres to the principle of “possess what you have,” which confirms the legitimacy of the current border. 

For Pakistan, acknowledging the Durand Line is a matter of strategic importance. Any re-evaluation of the border affects a significant portion of its northwestern territories and could jeopardize the country’s integrity. Islamabad has maintained a firm stance, demanding that Kabul officially recognize the 2,640-kilometer boundary; it has never questioned the legitimacy of the border. 

The situation surrounding the Durand Line vividly illustrates how decisions made in the late 19th century within an imperial geopolitical framework continue to shape regional security dynamics more than 130 years later. From the perspective of the British colonial administration, this was an entirely acceptable tool for managing peripheral territories. However, the long-term implications of this arrangement have sown seeds of discord that persist to this day. When the British withdrew from the region, the composition of the actors may have changed, but the underlying contradictions remained. Consequently, Britain left behind a legacy of tensions that are now playing out in a new geopolitical context.

Additionally, the Durand Line divided the Pashtun tribes living on both sides of the border, which sowed the seeds for long-term conflict.

When Hamid Karzai was president of Afghanistan (2001–2014), the so-called ‘Pashtun issue’ was not brought to the forefront. While Karzai described the Durand Line as a “line of hatred that built a wall between two brothers,” he simultaneously advocated for fostering neighborly relations with Islamabad. Karzai’s stance was contradictory: he categorically rejected the legitimacy of the Durand Line while also refraining from backing projects aimed at creating an independent Pashtunistan.

Under Karzai’s leadership, Afghanistan did not initiate any legal procedures to revisit the Durand Agreement through the UN or other international arbitration mechanisms. Essentially, Afghanistan limited itself to political non-recognition, but did not contest the issue on an institutional level.

At the same time, Pakistan sought to shape Kabul’s political landscape to its advantage. Islamabad hoped that a cooperative Afghan government would not challenge its territorial interests and could provide strategic depth against India. This expectation informed Pakistan’s policy toward the Taliban in the 1990s and after 2001, when it supported the group in the hope of cultivating a loyal regime in Kabul – one that would maintain the status quo on borders while advancing Pakistan’s regional objectives.

However, following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, it became clear that the group does not consider itself a dependent partner of Pakistan and is unwilling to officially recognize the border in its current form. The Taliban’s position aligns with traditional Afghan state policy: the border is viewed as historically disputed. This has been a significant disappointment for Pakistani leadership and has intensified mutual distrust.

Since March 2024, clashes between Pakistan and Afghanistan along the Durand Line have become systemic. This has surprised many experts and observers. The conflict has gradually escalated beyond localized incidents into the phase of regular armed confrontations. A peak in this escalation occurred in October 2025, when the Pakistani army seized 19 Afghan border posts during skirmishes with Taliban forces. This episode highlighted not only the high level of militarization in the border area but also the lack of effective de-escalation mechanisms between the parties involved.

Moreover, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militant group operates on Pakistani territory. It is primarily composed of ethnic Pashtuns that want independence from Pakistan. The presence of ideologically aligned groups within Pakistan heightens internal risks, turning the Afghan factor into a domestic security issue.

The situation is further complicated by regional rivalries. Pakistan has accused Afghanistan of expanding military-political ties with India. In turn, Kabul insists that as a sovereign state, it has the right to develop relations with any country, asserting that cooperation between Afghanistan and India is not directed against Pakistan.

China is also playing a significant role in this matter. Beijing remains one of the key arms suppliers to Pakistan. It has provided advanced military equipment to Islamabad, including fifth-generation J-35 fighter jets, KJ-500 early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, and HQ-19 anti-ballistic missile systems. This significantly boosts Pakistan’s military capabilities and impacts the regional balance of power.

On the other hand, China actively cooperates not just with Pakistan, but also with the Afghan authorities, including the Taliban leadership, and is interested in stability rather than a large-scale regional conflict. 

Should escalation continue, the most likely scenario involves an increase in remote combat tactics: airstrikes on Taliban command centers as well as the active use of artillery and drones. A full-scale ground invasion of Afghanistan by Pakistani forces seems unlikely for several reasons. Firstly, it carries the risk of protracted warfare in challenging mountainous terrain. Secondly, Pakistan’s close ties with China, particularly through major infrastructure projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), complicate matters. This initiative is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and includes strategic transportation, energy, and port facilities. A large-scale war could jeopardize Chinese investments, which would not serve the interests of either China or Pakistan.

Meanwhile, alternative logistics are emerging. In recent years, Afghanistan has partially redirected its trade flows toward Iran after closing its borders with Pakistan. Exports through Iranian ports have increased, and the Chabahar Port is developing with India’s involvement as an alternative to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port. Strategically, this provides India with direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, circumventing Pakistan.

Islamabad is worried about this situation, since India gains entry into the region through Iran, while Afghanistan reduces its dependence on Pakistani transit routes. At the same time, Pakistan’s desire to avoid worsening relations with Tehran limits its options for hardline action. The military-political engagement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia adds another layer of complexity to the situation. Despite a partial normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, stability remains uncertain. In this intricate setup, any increase in tension could trigger a chain reaction.

Ultimately, the conflict surrounding the Durand Line stems from a combination of factors: 19th-century colonial legacy, unresolved border legitimacy issues, Pakistan’s strategic disillusionment with the Taliban, regional competition among India, China, and Iran, and geo-economic rivalry when it comes to infrastructure projects. 

While a full-scale ground war seems improbable, the current escalation heightens instability at the crossroads of three regions – South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. The unfolding events amplify uncertainty and increase the risks of further fragmentation in regional security.

If both parties are not brought to the negotiating table soon, tensions are likely to rise – and considering Pakistan’s military capabilities and Afghanistan’s resilience, the conflict may become exceptionally brutal.